United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, came into force on August 12, following the confluence of two related events affecting the military balance in Lebanon. First, Israeli forces in Lebanon faced formidable resistance from Hezbollah militia which stymied efforts by Israeli troops to achieve outright and immediate military victory. For its part, the Hezbollah leadership realized that stalemating Israeli military might had its political costs in terms of political acceptance among other Lebanese religious and communal groups. The suffering of life and property of Lebanon by Israeli ground and air forces, which had been offset by admiration for Hezbollah from across the Lebanese communities, began to take its political toll.

Israeli Prime minister Ehud Olmert came in for fierce criticism for the handling of the military campaign launched July 12. The chief of the Israeli defence force was criticised for relying too much on air power. But the underlying reason for the less than commendable performance of the Israeli ground forces seem to be more sociological than military tactics: the bulk of the Israeli reservists who were called for duty came from a new generation of professionals in the management, service and information service sectors. Unlike previous generation of Israeli soldiers, who were more hardy and tribulation-tested men and women coming from the harsher farms and rural areas, the new generation soldiers had less training and field experience to face the guerrilla-cum-rocket technology type warfare adapted by Hezbollah.


For his part, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged somewhat ruefully in an interview that had he knew that the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah in mid-July would have sparked the 34 day war he would not have embarked on that move. Coming from a figure that had gained stature among anti-Israeli Muslim across the world, it was a rare admission of the limits (and costs) of Hezbollah bravado.

As it stands, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has still to be fully implemented. Israeli still applies naval blockade to parts of Lebanon deemed likely to become channels for military support to Hezbollah. Israeli troops still occupy key areas in southern Lebanon, along which the reinforced UN peacekeeping force is expected to take over to secure the peace.

From the outset Indonesia has maintain the position that the essence of Resolution 1701 was to enable the Lebanese government and Army regain full control and authority over its own territory. That seems to be the message of the resolution’s reference to “all armed personnel” other than that of the Lebanese authorities be withdrawn from Lebanon. In essence, it avoids UN peacekeepers having to disarm Hezbollah while at the same time affirming the imperative for the Lebanese government to assert full control over Hezbollah militia through Hezbollah’s party wing in the coalition government. Only the Lebanese Army would disarm Hezbollah.

In diplomatic-speak, the mandate of the UN PKO forces is to be engaged in “pro-active self defence”. “The reinforced” or “robust” peacekeepers from the European Union and selected Asian countries will not hesitate to use measured force to implement Resolution 1701. Therein lies the confluence of diplomatic language and the new balance of military power on the ground. The strains of military attrition suffered by both Hezbollah militia and the Israeli forces in the 34-day conflict have, for the moment, made diplomacy gain the higher ground. The UN takes centre stage again for the time being.