American policy makers are debating the merits of the Congress-mandated Baker-Hamilton Report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) announced almost three weeks ago. The gist of the ISG report calls for an American military withdrawal within 18 months, well before the US presidential elections in November 2008. President Bush has rejected the ISG recommendation for a “graceful interval” of US forces pull out of Iraq, implying that the US will remain in Iraq until “the forces of freedom” triumph there.
At the same time, the Pentagon is wrapping up its own Iraq Review. The Pentagon review, led by Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace and prepared by three American colonels (two army and one marine) with experience on the ground in various insurgency-afflicted countries, provides a much more “ground level” military approach to the American military role in Iraq. The three options mentioned___ Go Big, Go Long and Go Home aims to boost US troop presence by 20.000 personnel, stave off sectarian violence and support Iraq to build a government of “national reconciliation”. There is no mention of a timetable for American withdrawal, though Defense Secretary Robert Gates has acknowledged that America “cannot win in Iraq.” However, there seems to be speculation that a “Go Long” strategy means “a surge” of American troop increase (“Go Big”), will eventually lead to a “Go Home” scenario.
In essence, American policymakers are reviewing the role of US military forces abroad, realizing that superior military technology has limits over essentially social and political problems on the ground. The paradox of American military power seems to be that the more overwhelming its military presence the less influential it becomes on matters pertaining to the local social and cultural situation on the ground. This is true of Afghanistan and even more pertinent to the situation in present day Iraq.
The recently published Pentagon “FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency” field manual asserts that American soldiers and marines must be prepared to be “nation-builders” as well as “warriors.” The aim is not to kill as many insurgents as possible but to maximise support from the local population (the old “winning hearts and minds” doctrine of 1960s Vietnam).
The US revised military doctrine is a throwback to the military doctrine of Indonesia in the early 1960s, when the Indonesian Army adapted its strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people in its counter-insurgency against the Darul Islam (DI) and Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) in West and Central Java, as well as South Sulawesi.
This much is acknowledged by George Packer in an article in The New Yorker magazine of December 18, 2006. Entitled “Knowing the Enemy”, Packer article cites the role of Australian colonel David Kilcullen, who currently assists the Pentagon in revising US military doctrine abroad . Kilcullen’s experience as a captain in a language immersion program in West Java in the early 1990s revealed to him the essentially political and anthropological nature of the “Islamic insurgency” in West Java. It was, he acknowledged, not a primarily religious as a matter of social identity and network. Kilcullen later completed a dissertation in political anthropology on the Darul Islam conflict at the University of New South Wales. Paraphrasing the American political scientist Roger Petersen, he observes “People don’t get involved into a rebellion bytheir ideology. They get pulled in by their social networks.”
The Indonesian Army in the early 1960s effectively won over the hearts and minds of the local populace because it was able to deploy soldiers skilled in networking with the people, understanding the local social and cultural make-up, thereby effectively depriving the DI and TII of their social support . More recently, the Indonesian army’s territorial back-up role of the police effectively deprived the DI’s supposedly successor, the Jemaah Islamiyah of popular support among moderate Islamic civic organizations.
The Indonesian Army was less successful with East Timor, when its militias created a backlash and instigated events that eventually led to the birth of Timor Leste.
There is of course one big difference between the current Iraq problem and the Indonesian Army success in the early 1960s. That is the importance of the information warfare conducted by insurgents everywhere against heavily armed conventional armed forces too reliant on technology and firepower. Al Qaeda and other anti-American insurgents skillfully manipulated satellite television coverage and the internet to apply political pressure to the millions of American viewers at home. Iraq effectively became a major domestic political agenda in the US.
It has been argued that anti-American insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan attacked American forces and interests to deliberately help re-elect George Bush in 2004, knowing that his hard line policies would further inflame anti-Americanism and replenish financial as well as political support against American military presence in Iraq . The Indonesian experience in battling Islamic insurgents in the early 1960s may be one useful lesson. But Indonesia’s loss of East Timor in 1999-2002 could be of greater relevance to the Pentagon planners contemplating the Iraq problem in the months and years ahead.
*) Wishing you a safe and happy holidays, and a prosperous New Year!
It is important that the “cowboy approach” should be stopped and start to learn and respect more of the other people’s culture/values and respect them. This way, at least the U.S. would be able to gracefully succeed to withdraw safely from Iraq.
When I first read the article I was glad to see that even the mighty American military who usually depends on high-weaponry now starts to see the utility of social sciences. They realize that technology cannot solve all problems. At the end, it is about people and thus understanding social dynamics is important.
The pentagon now forges close relationships with US universities including social scientists to solve pressing problems in the military such as how to organize the military so it fits to the current challenges. (e.g., how social sciences can contribute to the formulation of net-centric warfare).
It makes me wonder to what extent the Indonesian military works together with Indonesian social scientists.
Finally, they think…or not ? IRAN is the next target….
The point is well taken that U.S. military policy in Iraq ignores the lessons of the past. Unfortunately, American military officers who insist on a sensible approach to the situation in Iraq routinely lose their jobs.
Perhaps the Bush administration’s management of the war in Iraq is the result not of stupidity, but rather of deliberate calculation. I would like to suggest that American economic policy and foreign policy is usually controlled behind the scenes by an Anglo-American financier oligarchy. Their consistent policy, for many decades, has been to repeatedly destabilize both Iraq and Iran. (Remember Mossadegh?) These two countries, with the combination of oil wealth, a relatively high population density, and an ancient cultural tradition, have the potential to become truly independent. Perhaps these countries are worth comparing to Indonesia.
Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark describes this deliberate American policy of destabilizing Iraq and Iran in the first chapter of his book, “The Fire This Time.”
William Engdahl explains the broader geopolitical context for this policy in his book, “A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.”
John Perkins’ book, “Confessions of an Economic Hit Man,” describes how he helped to set up Indonesia and other countries for economic destabilization, on behalf of what he calls a U.S. government/business “corporatocracy.”
In the early 1980s, shortly after Mexico discovered huge new oil deposits, the “Economic Hit Men” drove Mexico into bankruptcy. This resulted in domination by the International Monetary Fund and decades of suffering for the impoverished Mexican people. See “How Mexico Fought the Hit Men” in the Dec. 24, 2004 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
I recall, about ten years ago, a front-page story in the Los Angeles Times, reporting that the International Monetary Fund admitted that it “made mistakes” in its structural adjustment program for Indonesia. I don’t know if the I.M.F. actually changed anything. Around the same time, Russia was undergoing a similar I.M.F. program of economic restructuring. Russia’s former Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Sergei Glazyev, wrote about Russia’s experience in his book, “Genocide: Russia and the New World Order.” Glazyev described an international financial oligarchy that uses “globalization” to exploit the world’s poor countries. The consequences, in Glazyev’s view, amount to “genocide” as defined in the United Nations Genocide Convention.
In 1988, senior I.M.F. official Davison Budhoo confessed that he and the I.M.F. were guilty of crimes against humanity in what he called “our own peculiar Holocaust.” Budhoo described I.M.F. structural adjustment programs as “a tool for deepening poverty and unleashing further destitution in the South.” These programs “represent only the periphery of an iniquitous and surprisingly comprehensive system within which the Fund undertakes, directly and with premeditation, massive people-related economic crimes, including the performance of acts of unimagined horror in the countries of the South.” The first few pages of Budhoo’s 100-page resignation letter from the I.M.F. are online at http://www.webspawner.com/users/davisonbudhoo/index.html
It would seem that, in Iraq today, the U.S. government deliberately ignoring sound military doctrine. In doing so, is it perpetrating acts of “unimagined horror” designed to ruin that country?
I just wonder to myself about how American set their mind. Do they learn for what happened years ago ? Vietnam !
Where’s Monroe doctrine ? I only approve this American way ( hit first, problems later) when they fight with Japan during WW II. I can not imagine if the japs didn’t get the nuke ! Maybe indonesia doesn’t exist like now…
Personally, i agree that peace can be assured by military approach. But what America did was a nonsense. Bush did a b**ls**t and people now know the truth!
Thank GOD Bush losing his people confidance!
Saya ingin bertanya kepada bapak Menhan RI ttg 1. prioritas kepemimpinan bp dalam mengambil kebijakan pertahanan pd ta 2008,apakah dapat meningkatkan kinerja Dephan/TNI. 2 bagaimana pendapat bp tentang perkembangan perjanjian militer dengan negara tetangga RI, ditinjau dari Hanneg, terima kasih