United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, came into force on August 12, following the confluence of two related events affecting the military balance in Lebanon. First, Israeli forces in Lebanon faced formidable resistance from Hezbollah militia which stymied efforts by Israeli troops to achieve outright and immediate military victory. For its part, the Hezbollah leadership realized that stalemating Israeli military might had its political costs in terms of political acceptance among other Lebanese religious and communal groups. The suffering of life and property of Lebanon by Israeli ground and air forces, which had been offset by admiration for Hezbollah from across the Lebanese communities, began to take its political toll.
Israeli Prime minister Ehud Olmert came in for fierce criticism for the handling of the military campaign launched July 12. The chief of the Israeli defence force was criticised for relying too much on air power. But the underlying reason for the less than commendable performance of the Israeli ground forces seem to be more sociological than military tactics: the bulk of the Israeli reservists who were called for duty came from a new generation of professionals in the management, service and information service sectors. Unlike previous generation of Israeli soldiers, who were more hardy and tribulation-tested men and women coming from the harsher farms and rural areas, the new generation soldiers had less training and field experience to face the guerrilla-cum-rocket technology type warfare adapted by Hezbollah.
