Posts from the “Defense” Category

Security Rebalancing Act

Posted on December 27, 2011

The year-end trans-regional meetings of the G-20 in Nice, the APEC in Honolulu and the East Asian Summit in Bali serve to underscore the implications of the “stall speed” economies in North America and Europe to all other economies, businesses and governments throughout Asia, Latin America and Africa.

In the globally interconnected financial system, there are now more sober assessments about the economic trajectories of China, India, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa and other emerging markets. Political crises in the Middle East and civic unrest in Russia have grave implications over the viability of the euro and energy supplies from Europe to Central Asia.

The key question is: How will the global security environment impact the future of market access and economic stability within Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, China, Japan, South Korea and other economies in Latin America and Africa?

How will debates on retrenching the US defense budget over the next 10 years affect strategic assurances to the economies in mature as well as in emerging markets? Which power or combination of military powers can provide the all important security assurances that are vital to underpin economic recovery, deliver political stability and provide security assurances that markets anywhere ultimately rely on?

How will the global security environment evolve and how will regional security arrangements assure domestic market stability and predictability? The stability of debt restructuring in Europe depends on the security balance reached between the United States, NATO and Russia.

In East Asia, the terms and conditions of regional security depend on America’s commitment to the global commons and on China’s tacit acceptance of the preponderance of the US Navy for at least another 10 years. In Latin America and Africa, the American military presence helps assure regional economic and trade groupings, which offer timely financing to ensure sustainability in the war against drug and criminal gangs threatening nations’ social and cultural fabric.

The fulcrum of political-military “balance of power” and the evolving “power of balance” incorporating economic, financial, trade, investment and energy interaction traversing Europe, Central and the Middle East, Asia and Latin America will have to be factored in the overall rebalancing process.

As Russia, China and India develop greater military capabilities, can their desire to be preeminent in their respective “core areas of national interest” (Russia in Eastern Europe, China and India in Asia) be accommodated by American strategists increasingly aware of the need to share some degree of “strategic space” with Russia, China and India?

When the United States launched the 2008 Comprehensive Cyber Defense Capability, the stated goal was to ensure that US cyber security integrated federal, state government and private sector capabilities at all levels. It implied that US cyber defense covers military, business and finance sectors that serve to advance and protect the national security interest of the United States.

The lessons learned from cases of Russian and Chinese hacking into American systems in business and economic competitiveness have not been lost by influential business and political leaders.

More than ever, strategic linear planning must increasingly mesh with coordinated cyber capabilities. The subtle combination of “soft”, “smart” and “hard” powers has captured the imagination of leadership groups in government, in private business and in the military. Through this combination the US government and businesses can best connect, cooperate as well as compete across the world.

Increasingly, there is an urgent need to prepare more skilled and better-educated military officers able to interface not only with the planning of “military battles” over physical space, but also in areas of the “non-military battles” of ideas, of knowledge and of scientific skills, which are increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to thrive in a “24/7” globalized world. Research in science and technology must continuously be prioritized to maintain America’s competitiveness against emerging market ascendancy.

In the US, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom, the curricula of “network centric warfare” emphasizes the need to interact and interface continuously to a broad community of military units, business schools and academia. That is the essence of “total defense” in applying information technology and the power of the Internet.

At the recent Bali meeting of higher military educational institutions from ASEAN and neighboring nations, there was common understanding that ASEAN countries should adopt a comprehensive vision integrating the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local so that “access to” and “claims over” strategic resources in their respective countries and in internationally disputed areas can be resolved through mediation and peaceful negotiation. “Sovereign space” between and among the 10 ASEAN countries must be respected among all defense officials.

ASEAN leaders in government, business and the defense-security services have vital roles in preparing the next generation of leadership to be able identify future areas of long-term collaboration in government, businesses and defense throughout East Asia. Likewise, foreign, home, trade and finance ministries will have to hone their knowledge and personal instincts to enhance leadership skills combining political, economic and military “situational awareness” with greater degrees of “technical competence”.

The combined but subtle applications of soft, smart and hard powers must become the overall learning processes in all ASEAN countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. This pool of human resources in the application of brain-warfare is ASEAN’s commitment to be counted in the East Asia rebalancing process.

Current and future generations of civilian, business and military officials in ASEAN, both at the national and local levels, must assume shared responsibility to secure the ASEAN Economic Community. Support from capable civilian, business and military leaders is crucial to the transformation of ASEAN into a credible entity within Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as well as within the over-all global rebalancing act in the years to come.

Categories: Defense, International

Redefining ASEAN Security In The Region

Posted on May 11, 2011

The upcoming ASEAN Summit from May 7 to 9, 2011, provides an opportunity for its 10 member states to review the defense and security context of the continuing thrust as a pivotal regional grouping engaged in aligning major power interests in Southeast Asia. In strategic terms, there are five dimensions of military security that together define the political, economic and socio-cultural success of the ASEAN Security Community.

First, Satelllite-based cyber defense: the use of satellite communications technology to transmit, encrypt, capture and control the transmission and content of military communications in space, including tracking and intercepting systems utilized and deployed by the military.

The United States, Russia, Japan and China dominate space-based defense technology. European countries, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore provide first and second-tier advanced communications technology systems deployed by land, sea and air forces.

Second, Strategic Nuclear: nuclear weapons with high-grade explosive capability with launch-capabilities of over 6,500 kilometers from land, sea and air. The United States and Russia lead the field with over 8,000-12,000 strategic nuclear warheads with command and control capabilities. China and India have fewer warheads, shorter launches as well as lesser command and control capability.

Third, Ballistic Nuclear: nuclear weapons with launch capability at ranges of 1,500-2,000 kilometers.The United States, Russia, China, India, France, the United Kingdom and North Korea are states that possess warheads and delivery systems linked to tactical nuclear weapons, deployed in tandem with conventional forces.

Fourth, Tri-Service Conventional Defense: “The military balance” usually associated with distribution and the quality of conventional army, navy and air forces’ ability to defend territorial integrity and maintain “deterrence” in conventional terms. The US is the only power with Carrier Strike Group (CSG) capability in the region as well as worldwide.

Fifth, Undersea Capability: deployment of undersea nuclear powered/nuclear-weapon submarine deployment, armed with strategic missile strike capabilities. Only the United States has the range capability in terms of numbers and accuracy, with Russia, China and India actively developing anti-ship missile capability, designed at enhancing their respective “strategic space” and “far sea” presence.

The above macro-security dimensions underwrite both the intra-regional and trans-regional economic relations. Japan, South Korea and later China benefited from American “security assurance” that provided economic, trade and invesment commitments in the Pacific. ASEAN today has become a community of 10 nations with a combined GDP of US$1.4 trillion.

The security, trade and investment complementarities linking Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean are covered by America’s critical role as the “security assurance” underpinning trans-regional stability. It survived upheavals in Southeast Asia, periodic crises over the Taiwan Straits and occasional tensions in the Korean peninsula.

The rise of China and India as regional and global economic powers has given rise to a desire by both nations to enhance “strategic space” in their respective “core areas of national interest”, in Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean respectively. China and India’s core area of security presence will be taken into greater account as each nation increases its conventional power capability and affects ASEAN’s stance on regional security.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)/ASEAN Security Community (ASC) aims to foster intra-regional links leading to market-driven economic prosperity. ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea, China), ASEAN+6 (Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand, India) followed by ASEAN+8 with the entry of the United States and Russia in 2010, are enhancing the concept of regional security in an interconnected world.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, since May 2006, has provided a vehicle for ASEAN to provide “strategic space” among resident powers as well as calibrate “technological parity” with extra-regional military powers in order that regional security and economic progress become mutually reinforcing.

All of these collaborative clusters need to be carefully harmonized with the right pitch of military presence. The fulcrum of strategic “balance of power” and the evolving “power of balance”, incorporating economic, financial (AMRO, the ASEAN Macro Economics Research Office), trade (ACFTA, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area), investment and energy interactions need to be carefully calibrated by all nations in the region. The entire Trans Pacific Partnership community constitutes 78 percent of world GDP.

The key issues for ASEAN and for Indonesia in particular for the next 10-15 years: How coordinated and synchronized will ASEAN’s public and private leaders be to harness a concerted vision about its geo-political location relative to its geo-economic competitive strength? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exemplify the imperative to utilize “brain power” in order “to live off” the rest of the world precisely because they do not possess natural resources.

What combination of “hard”, “soft” and “smart” powers must ASEAN’s leadership groups in the government, in the military and in private business command in order to be able to connect and cooperate with the US, Japan, China, Russia and India? Can the national security state cope with technological, economic and financial globalization? Can territorial defenses adapt to the functional aspects of global economic and financial competitiveness arising from the pervasive uses of technological innovation?

With a population of almost 500 million, ASEAN must adopt comprehensive policy visions simultaneously linking the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local levels. There is a need for more skilled and educationally trained civilian, business and military leaders who are skilled at interfacing the planning of “military battles” over physical space with areas where “non-military battles” of ideas, innovation, knowledge and financial and management skills become increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to survive in a “24/7” competitive world.

Within the fused economies of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Pacific and the Indian Ocean, ASEAN’s notion of total defense and security must merge territorial defense with functional defense. The real test for each ASEAN country is to provide broad-based social and economic justice at home. Indonesia must ensure sustainable human security, from Aceh to Papua, from North Sulawesi to East Nusa Tenggara. In the final analysis, social and economic justice is Indonesia’s best defense. A strong and stable Indonesia is in the interest of all ASEAN and for security cooperation with all major extra-regional powers.

*) The article was an excerpt from the opening remarks at the 4th NADI (Network of ASEAN Defense Institutes) Workshop in Jakarta on April 19, 2011.

Categories: Defense, International

GWOT SAVE our OCO contest

Posted on June 24, 2009

First it was GWOT (Global War On Terror). Then for a time it became SAVE (Strategy Against Violent Extremism). Later on, it became CONTEST (Counter Terrorism Strategy) with the 4 P’s of “Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.”

Now, albeit unofficially, it’s OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations). When it comes to counter-terrorism, there has been no shortage of acronyms popping up in the bureaucracies of the security and intelligence communities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

GWOT first sprang up immediately after September 11, 2001, when President George W. Bush pronounced his famous “you’re either with us or with the terrorists” rallying call, understandable under the circumstances following the devastating attacks in New York and Washington at the time. To the credit of Jacques Chirac, who was the first foreign head of government to visit President Bush less than two weeks after 9/11, the French president expressed reservation over the choice of the word “war”.

Chirac understood the dangers of using the expression “war on terror”, and that it would elicit the notion of the war of the Christian “crusaders” against Islamic “jihadists” among France’s Muslim community, the largest in Western Europe. It would play into Al Qaida’s strategy of provoking tension between the “Christian West” and the “Muslim East”.

But GWOT became a popular rallying cry among right-wing and hard-line “security first” politicians in North America and Western Europe. It captured the imagination of bureaucrats who pushed for tighter domestic security policies against “potential” Muslim “sleepers” or “Trojan horse” subversives.

SAVE came into fashion around 2005-2006, when the “global war” pursued in Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan persuaded politicians in the US and UK that a successful long-term strategy against Muslim terrorism had to go right to “cultural roots of the problem” in a particular country in the Middle East or South Asia. Kinetic-based counter-terrorist actions, including the use of special forces and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) operated from Nevada often inadvertently targeted innocent civilians suspected of being involved in terrorist acts in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Over the past decade, intelligence chiefs throughout South East Asia have exchanged notes in facing radical groups who often manipulated Islamic notions of “jihad” by home grown, region-based as well as international-linked terrorist groups. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia undertook “re-integration programs” in which suspected terrorists or those convicted of violent acts are provided with “remedial programs” incorporating welfare related schemes as well as provide rehabilitation sessions guiding them to the true path of Muslim toleration.

The Indonesian Defense Force, particularly the Army, has discretely but effectively recalibrated its role to launch effective Territorial Capacity Buiding (TCB) programs. Its twin track schemes provide governance capacity building for village, local and township management as well as supporting economic development delivery systems. Reinforcing governance capacity and providing economic support (repair of irrigation canals, bridges, rehabilitating houses of worship in previously sectarian-strife areas, teaching arithmetic and Bahasa Indonesia in isolated areas) create a positive environment of “nation-building” and “nation replenishing” at the grass roots level.

This is the other side of GWOT, SAVE and OCO. The real issue is that of matching satellite-based and air launched technology of war should be calibrated with the ground-level anthropology challenge of graduated winning hearts and minds. GWOT, SAVE and OCO can only succeed if these ground level social, economic and cultural issues are resolved at the scope and speed willingly undertaken by local leaders.

Categories: Defense